1.Информация «неподдающаяся оценке».

Информация, переданная Толкачевым на первой личной встрече, была быстро оценена узким кругом гражданских и военных специалистов. Она имела «немедленное воздействие», как было отмечено в меморандуме высокопоставленных военных, направленном в марте 1979 г. Директору центральной разведки. В нем говорилось, что вся информация, переданная «специальным источником», полностью соотносится с имеющейся фото и электронной разведывательной информацией. Новые переданные данные, если бы их оценивали советские специалисты, наносят им прямой значительный ущерб и являются весьма ценными для Вашингт

2... Robert Hanssen Affidavit

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
http://www.cicentre.com/Documents/DOC_Hanssen_Affidavit.htm

http://www.razvedka.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=8

1. ...В результате, с учетом отсутствия какой-либо информации о личности инициативника, его доступе к секретной информации, сложной для резидентуры контрразведывательной обстановки тогдашний хозяин Лэнгли Стэнсфилд Тернер (1977-81) решил не давать ответа на предложение русского...
...Первая встреча с Толкачевым стала решающей. Переданная им информация убедила всех, даже многих «твердолобых» скептиков, что ЦРУ имеет дело с инициативником располагающим огромным потенциалом. Управление и резидентура начали активно отрабатывать вопросы связи с агентом.

ЦРУ столкнулось с трудностями по нескольким направлениям. Толкачев имел доступ к информации, представляющей огромную ценность, как для военных, так и по своей высокой технической значимости. Раннее подобная информация никогда не добывалась по советским делам. В дополнение ко всему, связь с Толкачевым осуществлялась путем личных встреч в Москве, а не через тайники, которые обычно применялись при работе с русскими источниками на территории их страны.

2. ... K sozaleniju tol'ko na anglijskom .. Affidawit (Search and arrest Warrant ) na R.Hansena. Soderzit
dos'e ,kotoroe wozmozno bilo wikradenno 1 sek posol'stwa w Kanade (wozmozno residenta SWR ) pri yxode
na stornnu protiwnika za oplatu wozmozno neskol'ko mln $

. THE KGB's "B" OPERATION

50. The sources of information described in the foregoing section have established the following regarding "B":

51. On or about October 4, 1985, a KGB Line PR officer in Washington, D.C., named Viktor M. Degtyar, received an envelope by mail, at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope was postmarked "Prince George's Co, MD" on October 1, 1985. Inside was an inner envelope, marked: "DO NOT OPEN. TAKE THIS ENVELOPE UNOPENED TO VICTOR I. CHERKASHIN." At that time, Viktor Ivanovich Cherkashin was the Line KR Chief at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. Inside the inner envelope was an unsigned typed letter from the person whom the KGB came to call "B." The letter read in part as follows:

DEAR MR. CHERKASHIN:

SOON, I WILL SEND A BOX OF DOCUMENTS TO MR. DEGTYAR. THEY ARE FROM CERTAIN OF THE MOST SENSITIVE AND HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED PROJECTS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL ARE ORIGINALS TO AID IN VERIFYING THEIR AUTHENTICITY. PLEASE RECOGNIZE FOR OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS THAT THERE ARE A LIMITED NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH THIS ARRAY OF CLEARANCES. AS A COLLECTION THEY POINT TO ME. I TRUST THAT AN OFFICER OF YOUR EXPERIENCE WILL HANDLE THEM APPROPRIATELY. I BELIEVE THEY ARE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A $100,000 PAYMENT TO ME.

I MUST WARN OF CERTAIN RISKS TO MY SECURITY OF WHICH YOU MAY NOT BE AWARE. YOUR SERVICE HAS RECENTLY SUFFERED SOME SETBACKS. I WARN THAT MR. BORIS YUZHIN (LINE PR, SF), MR. SERGEY MOTORIN, (LINE PR, WASH.) AND MR. VALERIY MARTYNOV (LINE X, WASH.) HAVE BEEN RECRUITED BY OUR "SPECIAL SERVICES."

"B" proceeded to describe in detail a particular highly sensitive and classified information collection technique. In addition, "TO FURTHER SUPPORT MY BONA FIDES" he provided specific closely-held items of information regarding then-recent Soviet detectors. "B" added:

DETAILS REGARDING PAYMENT AND FUTURE CONTACT WILL BE SENT TO YOU PERSONALLY. . . . MY IDENTITY AND ACTUAL POSITION IN THE COMMUNITY MUST BE LEFT UNSTATED TO ENSURE MY SECURITY. I AM OPEN TO COMMO SUGGESTIONS BUT WANT NO SPECIALIZED TRADECRAFT. I WILL ADD 6, (YOU SUBTRACT 6) FROM STATED MONTHS, DAYS AND TIMES IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OF OUR FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS.

The information concerning the FBI's recruitment of Yuzhin, Motorin, and Martynov was classified at least at the SECRET level, as was the defector information. The sensitive information collection technique described above was classified at the TOP SECRET level.

52. Valeriy Fedorovich Martynov was a KGB Line X officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., from October 1980 to November 1985. In April 1982, the FBI recruited Martynov to serve as an agent-in-place, and he was debriefed jointly by the FBI and the CIA. Martynov was compromised to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 and by "B" in October 1985, as described above. Based in part on the information provided by "B", the KGB directed Martynov to return to Moscow in November 1985, ostensibly to accompany KGB officer Vitaliy Yurchenko, who was returning to the Soviet Union after his August 1985 defection to the United States. Upon arriving in Moscow on or about November 7, 1985, Martynov was arrested, and he was subsequently tried on espionage charges. Martynov was convicted and executed.

53. Sergey Mikhailovich Motorin was a KGB Line PR officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C., from June 1980 to January 1985. In January 1983, the FBI recruited Motorin to serve as an agent-in-place, and he was debriefed by the FBI. Motorin returned to Moscow at the end of his tour of duty in January 1985. Motorin, like Martynov, was compromised to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 and by "B" in October 1985, as described above. Based in part on the information "B" gave the KGB, Motorin was arrested in November or December 1985, tried and convicted on espionage charges during the period of October-November 1986, and executed in February 1987.

54. Boris Nikolayevich Yuzhin was a KGB Line PR officer assigned to San Francisco under cover as a student from 1975 to 1976, and then as a TASS correspondent from 1978 to 1982. The FBI recruited him to serve as an agent-in-place, and debriefed him. After returning to the Soviet Union, Yuzhin became the subject of an internal KGB investigation. Yuzhin was compromised to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 and by "B" in October 1985. Based in part on the information "B" gave the KGB, Yuzhin was arrested in December 1986, convicted of espionage, and sentenced to serve 15 years in prison. In 1992, he was released under a general grant of amnesty to political prisoners, and subsequently emigrated to the United States.

...59. On or about November 8, 1985, Deglyar and Cherkashin received a typed letter from "B", which read in part as follows:

Thank you for the 50,000.

I also appreciate your courage and perseverance in the face of generically reported bureaucratic obstacles. I would not have contacted you if it were not reported that you were held in esteem within your organization, an organization I have studied for years. I did expect some communication plan in your response. I viewed the postal delivery as a necessary risk and do not wish to trust again that channel with valuable material. I did this only because I had to so you would take my offer seriously, that there be no misunderstanding as to my long-term value, and to obtain appropriate security for our relationship from the start.

"B" then rejected the contact plans proposed by the KGB, and suggested a particular communications scheme based on "a microcomputer 'bulletin board'" at a designated location, with "appropriate encryption." Meanwhile, he wrote: "Let us use the same site again. Same timing. Same signals." "B" proposed that the next dead drop occur on "September 9" which, according to the "6" coefficient that he established with the KGB in his first letter, actually meant that the dead drop operation would take place on March 3, 1986.

....B" then described a United States Intelligence Community technical surveillance technique. He concluded:

If you wish to continue our discussions, please have someone run an advertisement in the Washington Times during the week of 1/12/87 or 1/19/87, for sale, "Dodge Diplomat, 1971, needs engine work, $1000." Give a phone number and time-of-day in the advertisement where I can call. I will call and leave a phone number where a recorded message can be left for me in one hour. I will say, "Hello, my name is Ramon. I am calling about the car you offered for sale in the Times." You will respond, "I'm sorry, but the man with the car is not here, can I get your number." The number will be in Area Code 212. I will not specify that Area Code on the line.

"B" signed the letter: "Ramon".

According to the established "6" coefficient, the weeks the advertisement was actually to run were July 6, 1986, or July 13, 1986.

62. Viktor Gundarev was a KGB Line KR officer who defected to the United States on February 14, 1986. A classified FBI debriefing report, dated March 4, 1986, reports that FBI debrief ers showed Gundarev a photo of Cherkashin and asked if he knew Cherkashin.

63. The following advertisement appeared in the Washington Times from July 14, 1986, to July 18, 1986:

DODGE - '71, DIPLOMAT, NEEDS ENGINE WORK, $1000. Phone (703) 451-9780 (CALL NEXT Mon., Wed., Fri. 1 p.m.)

.... On Monday, August 18, 1986, "B" telephoned 703/451-9780, and spoke with Fefelov. The latter portion of the conversation was recorded as follows: ([UI] = unintelligible)

"B": Tomorrow morning?

FEFELOV: Uh, yeah, and the car is still available for you and as we have agreed last time, I prepared all the papers and I left them on the same table. You didn't find them because I put them in another corner of the table.

"B": I see.

FEFELOV: You shouldn't worry, everything is okay. The papers are with me now.

"B": Good.

FEFELOV: I believe under these circumstances, mmmm, it's not necessary to make any changes concerning the place and the time. Our company is reliable, and we are ready to give you a substantial discount which will be enclosed in the papers. Now, about the date of our meeting. I suggest that our meeting will be, will take place without delay on February thirteenth, one three, one p.m. Okay? February thirteenth.

"B": [UI] February second?

FEFELOV: Thirteenth. One three.

"B": One three.

FEFELOV: Yes. Thirteenth. One p.m.

"B": Let me see if I can do that. Hold on.

FEFELOV: Okay. Yeah.

[pause]

"B": [whispering] [UI]

FEFELOV: Hello? Okay.

[pause]

"B": [whispering] Six .... Six ....

[pause]

"B": That should be fine.

FEFELOV: Okay. We will confirm you, that the papers are waiting for you with the same horizontal tape in the same place as we did it at the first time.

"B": Very good.

FEFELOV: You see. After you receive the papers, you will send the letter confirming it and signing it, as usual. Okay?

"B": Excellent.

FEFELOV: I hope you remember the address. Is . . . if everything is okay?

"B": I believe it should be fine and thank you very much.

FEFELOV: Heh-heh. Not at all. Not at all. Nice job. For both of us. Uh, have a nice evening, sir.

"B": Do svidaniya.

FEFELOV: Bye-bye.

http://www.cicentre.com/Documents/DOC_Hanssen_Affidavit.htm